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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a ] 
corporation, ] 
Plaintiff/Respondent, ] 
v. 
MOTOR CARGO, a Utah corporation, 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
i CASE NO. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Defendant/Petitioner, Motor Cargo (Motor Cargo), by and 
through its counsel of record, submits the following Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court and Ct>urt of Appeals, 
improperly disregarded the fundamental rule of construction that 
ambiguities in an insurance agreement should be construed against 
its drafter. 
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that 
the extrinsic evidence received by the trial court supports a 
finding that Motor Cargo knew it would lose its right to an 
excess premium refund in the event of early cancellation of its 
insurance agreement with Truck Insurance Exchange. 
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OPINION ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS 
On July 30, 1990, the Utah Court of Appeals issued its 
Opinion (hereinafter referred to as Appellate Court Opinion) 
affirming the judgment rendered by the Second Judicial District 
Court of Davis County, State of Utah, in favor of 
plaintiff/respondent, Truck Insurance Exchange (TIE) and against 
Motor Cargo. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
As noted above, the Court of Appeals entered its 
decision in this matter on July 30, 1990. On August 10, 1990, 
Motor Cargo filed its Petition for Rehearing. On August 17, 
1990, the Court of Appeals denied the Petition for Rehearing. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a), this Court has 
jurisdiction to review the decision of the Court of Appeals by a 
writ of certiorari. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
TIE brought this action against Motor Cargo to collect 
on amounts allegedly due TIE under a Retrospective Premium 
Determination Agreement - Plan III (Retro Agreement B) entered 
into between the parties. The parties filed cross motions for 
summary judgment in the trial court. The trial court granted 
TIE'S Motion for Summary Judgment as to its First Cause of 
Action, while denying it summary judgment on its Second Cause of 
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Action. In addition, the trial court denied Motor Cargo's 
Motion for Summary Judgment on its Counterclaim, but granted 
Motor Cargo leave to amend. As part of its Order and Judgment, 
the trial court stayed execution on the Judgment until all 
remaining claims asserted by the parties were fully adjudicated. 
On the remaining claims and accompanying issues not 
resolved by the above Order and Judgment, and pursuant to Rule 
39(b) and Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a 
trial was held on stipulated facts, affidavits of the parties, 
and the summary judgment and other memoranda in support of the 
various positions of the parties. The trial court thereafter 
issued its Memorandum Decision, granting judgment in favor of TIE 
on its First and Second Causes of Action, less a partial setoff 
by Motor Cargo for credit held by TIE, and dismissing Motor 
Cargo's First Cause of Action in its Amended Counterclaim 
asserting an excess premium refund of $56,931 to which Motor 
Cargo is entitled and which is confirmed by tTIE's own records. 
The trial court held that this Order and Judgment superseded its 
summary judgment noted above, and subsequently made and entered 
it Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (findings and 
Conclusions). (R. 388.) 
In its Findings and Conclusions, the trial court 
specifically concluded as a matter of law th^t Retro Agreement B 
was clear and unambiguous and entitled TIE to judgment in the 
amount of $68,394 plus interest, together wit;h attorneys' fees in 
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the amount of $14,500. In addition, the trial court made 
conclusions of law concerning the material provisions in Retro 
Agreement B upon which it based its decision. (Id.) 
Motor Cargo appealed the trial court's decision to this 
Court. The appeal was thereafter poured over to the Court of 
Appeals for decision, which resulted in affirmance of the trial 
court. In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals held that 
the trial court erred in its conclusion of law that Retro 
Agreement B was unambiguous, reasoning that two paragraphs 
therein directly conflicted with one another regarding Motor 
Cargo's right to an excess premium refund. The Court of Appeals, 
however, further concluded that the extrinsic evidence admitted 
by the trial court sufficiently established that Motor Cargo knew 
it would lose its right to a refund in the event of early 
cancellation. 
Motor Cargo now seeks a writ of certiorari from this 
Court to review the Court of Appeals' decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Motor Cargo is a Utah trucking company and common 
carrier with its principal place of business in North Salt Lake, 
Utah. (R. 24.) 
2. TIE is an insurer in the State of Utah which 
specializes in writing insurance policies for common carriers 
such as Motor Cargo. (R. 1.) 
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3. Pursuant to the application of Motor Cargo and the 
terms of an agreement between the parties dated March 1, 1979, 
designated as "Retrospective Premium Determination Agreement -
Plan III (Retro Agreement A), TIE issued its policy of insurance 
No, 6120-00-40 (the Policy) to Motor Cargo, having an effective 
date of March 1, 1979. (R. 389.) 
4. From March 1, 1979 to March 1, 1982, the term of 
Retro Agreement A and the Policy, TIE provided insurance coverage 
to Motor Cargo. (R. 390.) 
5. At Motor Cargo's request, th$ Policy was renewed 
for an additional three-year period beginning on March 1, 1982, 
and a second Retrospective Premium Determination Agreement - Plan 
III (Retro Agreement B) was executed by the parties. Id. A true 
and accurate copy of Retro Agreement B is attached as Exhibit C 
to the Complaint. (R. 11-14.) 
6. Retro Agreement B, signed by the parties on March 
2, 1982, was identical to Retro Agreement A except for certain 
percentage changes in the definition portion of Retro Agreement 
B. (R. 6-9, 11-14.) 
7. The Retro Agreements generally provide for a basic 
premium which Motor Cargo was required to pay on a monthly basis, 
but which allow adjustments to that premium fc>Y way of additional 
payments by Motor Cargo or credits or refunds to Motor Cargo for 
any excess payments. (Id.) 
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8. Retrospective rating under the Retro Agreements 
provides a method of determining, in retrospect, what the final 
earned premium for the Policy will be for the agreed term of the 
Policy. Retrospective rating is designed to benefit an insured 
with a good loss experience record. (R. 391.) 
9. Determining premiums retrospectively in the manner 
set forth in the Retro Agreements benefits the insured by 
allowing it the option of partial self-insurance, and because of 
the retrospective retention, of achieving broader insurance 
coverage at a reduced cost compared to the premium for similar 
coverage under a standard policy. (Id.) 
10. Paragraph 16 of Retro Agreement B clearly 
establishes a right in both TIE and Motor Cargo to cancel the 
Policy prior to expiration of the term. Specifically, paragraph 
16(a) provides that if Motor Cargo cancels the Policy, the 
premium due TIE "shall be computed in accordance with the other 
provisions" of Retro Agreement B, but that at a minimum, the 
premium would be 110% of the Retrospective Premium or Basic 
Premium, whichever is greater,. (R. 14.) 
11. Paragraph 13 of Retro Agreement B provides, among 
other things, that Motor Cargo would be refunded, periodically 
throughout the term of the Policy, any excess premium paid to 
TIE. Paragraph 13 in relevant part states: 
ADJUSTMENT OF PREMIUM. After computing the 
Retrospective Premium at the 60-day, 6-month, 
12-month, 24-month, and 36-month periods, and 
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provided the Retrospective Premium for the 
term of this agreement is less than all 
premium paid to the Exchange upon said 
policy, the Exchange shall, after each such 
computation . . . refund such excess premium 
to the Insured at such time and in the manner 
requested, . . . . 
(R. 13.) (Emphasis supplied.) 
12. Prior to execution of Retro Agreement B by Motor 
Cargo's representative, TIE'S representative explained to him 
that if Motor Cargo canceled Retro Agreement B before the three-
year term ended, it would lose "the benefit^ of retrospective 
rating." (R. 229-30.) 
13. In addition to the forgoing discussion between 
Motor Cargo and TIE, Motor Cargo's officer, Harold Tate, met with 
William K. Maxwell, a former insurance agent of TIE, who advised 
him, following a careful review of Retro Agreement B, that in his 
opinion Motor Cargo would not lose its right to an excess premium 
refund in the event of early cancellation. (R. 176.) 
14. On February 28, 1983, Motor C^rgo exercised its 
right of cancellation under paragraph 16 of Retro Agreement B by 
giving written notice to TIE of its intention to cancel all 
insurance policies then in effect between Motor Cargo and TIE, 
including the Policy. (R. 15.) 
15. In accordance with the notice of cancellation, TIE 
canceled the Policy as of February 28, 1983. (R. 16.) 
16. Following cancellation of the Policy, TIE 
submitted a premium report to Motor Cargo dated September 30, 
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1985 which, in accordance with paragraph 13, showed that Motor 
Cargo was entitled to a premium refund of $56,931, A copy of the 
premium report is attached as Exhibit A to the Affidavit of 
William K. Maxwell. (R. 180.) 
17. Following submission of the premium report to 
Motor Cargo, TIE sent Motor Cargo a final invoice showing a 
premium due of $68,394. The invoice, however, failed to credit 
Motor Cargo for the excess premium refund of $56,931 rightfully 
due Motor Cargo under paragraph 13 and confirmed by the premium 
report previously submitted by TIE. (R. 392-93.) A copy of the 
final invoice is attached as Exhibit G to the Affidavit of Paul 
J. Semons. (R. 169.) 
18. Motor Cargo took issue with TIE'S calculation of 
the premium due under Retro Agreement B. Thereafter, on 
October 12, 1983, TIE filed a Complaint against Motor Cargo to 
recover the above amounts allegedly due under the Retro 
Agreements. (R. 1-16.) 
19. Following discovery, the parties filed cross 
motions for summary judgment. (R. 135-72, 173-74, 181-97.) 
20. Following the trial court's ruling on the cross 
motions for summary judgment, the parties submitted for trial the 
resolution of Motor Cargo's First Cause of Action in its Amended 
Counterclaim concerning all premium refunds due to Motor Cargo 
under Retro Agreement B. 
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21. Following trial, the trial court, having reviewed 
the stipulated facts,1 affidavits of the parties, memoranda in 
support of the various positions of the parties and arguments of 
counsel, issued its Memorandum Decision holding that Retro 
Agreement B did not entitle Motor Cargo to an excess premium 
refund of $56,931 under the Policy. (R. 33$-40.) 
22. Following its decision, the trial court entered 
its Findings and Conclusions. (R. 388-97.) For the purposes of 
this Petition, the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law are material: 
16. The cancellation provision was 
specifically explained to an officer of Motor 
Cargo when the Retro Agreement wag entered 
into, that is, that in the event df 
cancellation of the Policy before the three 
(3) year term ended, Motor Cargo would lose 
the benefit of retrospective ratinjq. 
1. . . . The Court is required to look 
to the terms of the contract and their plain 
meaning on questions of interpretation. Only 
when the Court, finds the contract to be 
ambiguous or inconsistent may it turn to the 
general rules of construction, i.ej. favoring 
The parties, pursuant to Rule 39(a) (1)| of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, entered into a Stipulation on or about 
December 15 1987, basically setting forth th0 facts stipulated to 
for the purpose of the trial. The affidavit^ motions and 
memoranda in support of the various position^ of the parties were 
attached as exhibits to the Stipulation. Du^ to reasons unknown 
by Motor Cargo, the Stipulation, although relied upon by the 
trial court in making its decision, is not p^rt of the record on 
appeal. Thus, Motor Cargo refers to the Addendum at the end of 
this brief which incorporates the Stipulation as part of the 
record on appeal. See Addendum, infra. 
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specific provisions over general, first dated 
provisions over later/ and construction 
against the scrivener, 
• • • • 
7. Paragraph 13 of [Retro Agreement B] 
provides for adjustments to the premium for 
any excess premium under certain 
circumstances. 
8. Paragraph 16 of [Retro Agreement B] 
provides, among other things, that either 
party may cancel on thirty (30) days written 
notice and that the premium of cancellation 
prior to the end of the term shall be 
computed in accordance with the other 
provisions of [Retro Agreement B], subject to 
the additional provisions in Paragraph 16. 
9. One of the additional provisions of 
Paragraph 16 provides, in part, that if the 
insured cancels, the minimum earned premium 
shall be 110% of the Retrospective or Basic 
Premium, whichever is greater. 
11. Paragraph 16 specifically makes any 
manner of calculation in [Retro Agreement B] 
subject to the provisions of subparagraph 
16(a) which specifically establishes the 
minimum earned premium upon cancellation at 
110% of the Retrospective Premium or Basic 
Premium, whichever is greater. This 
paragraph makes no mention of any adjustments 
to these calculations, nor that there is to 
be a penalty of 10% of any premium so 
adjusted. 
12. Based upon the foregoing, the Court 
concludes that [Retro Agreement B] under its 
terms is clear and unambiguous and that the 
earned premium on cancellation by the 
insured, Motor Cargo, is equal to 110% of the 
Basic Premium or Retrospective Premium, 
whichever is greater, as calculated pursuant 
to Paragraphs 4, subparagraphs (a), (b), and 
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(c); Paragraph 12, and Paragraph tL6 of [Retro 
Agreement B]. 
(R. 393-97.) (Emphasis supplied.) 
23. On February 13, 1989, the trial court entered its 
Order and Judgment in accordance with its Conclusions of Law. 
(R. 398-99.) 
24. Motor Cargo thereafter appealed the trial court's 
judgment to the Court of Appeals, claiming t^ hat the trial court 
had erred, inter alia, as follows: 
(a) In concluding that RetrO Agreement B was 
unambiguous; 
(b) In concluding that Motorr Cargo was not 
entitled to an excess premium refund following early 
cancellation; and 
(c) In concluding that the extrinsic evidence 
admitted into evidence established that Motor Cargo knew it would 
lose its right to a premium refund in the evtent of early 
cancellation. 
25. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the 
trial court, reasoning: 
Two of the agreement's pertinent 
provisions directly conflict with one 
another. Paragraph 13 provides for the 
refund of excess retrospective premiums, 
following the computation of the I 
retrospective premiums at specified time 
intervals. Paragraph 16, on the other hand, 
provides that ff[t]he premium for a 
cancellation prior to the end of tne term of 
this agreement shall be computed in 
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accordance with the other provisions of this 
agreement, subject to the following 
additional provisions." (Emphasis added.) 
The operative additional provision in 
Paragraph 16 reads "the minimum earned 
premium shall be 110% of the Retrospective or 
Basic Premium, whichever is the greater, but 
the amount so calculated shall not exceed the 
Standard Premium as defined in this 
agreement. . . . " The trial court determined 
that since the basic premium was higher than 
the retrospective premium, Motor Cargo was 
not entitled to the excess premiums. 
* * * 
We disagree with the trial court's legal 
conclusion that the contract in this case is 
unambiguous. Paragraph 16 acknowledges the 
refund provision of paragraph 13, while at 
the same time imposing a penalty that 
arguably disregards Paragraph 13. A plain 
reading of the contract does not indicate 
whether "in accordance with" Paragraph 13 
controls over the contract being "subject to" 
the additional provisions of Paragraph 16. 
Nor does a plain reading lead to the sure 
conclusion that Motor Cargo would give up the 
premium refund plus pay a penalty rather than 
being subject to the more customary trade 
penalty of ten percent. 
Extrinsic evidence may be admitted to 
construe an ambiguous contract. See 50 W. 
Broadway Assoc., 784 P.2d at 1171; Kimball, 
699 P.2d at 716. This contract's ambiguity 
reguires extrinsic evidence in order for the 
contract to be properly interpreted. The 
court received such extrinsic evidence and 
refers to it in the findings. Such evidence 
showed that the parties discussed the 
provisions at issue prior to entering into 
the agreement and that they knew the excess 
premium refund would be lost in the event of 
cancellation by Motor Cargo. We therefore 
hold that the trial court correctly admitted 
extrinsic evidence in this case and, under 
the standard set forth in Kimball, we leave 
the court's findings of act undisturbed. 
12 
Appellate Court Opinion, pp. 2-3 (footnote Emitted and emphasis 
added). 
26. Motor Cargo now seeks a writ of certiorari to 
review the decision of the Court of Appeals^ 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS DISREGARDED THE FUNDAMENTAL 
RULE OF CONSTRUCTION THAT AMBIGUITIES IN AN 
INSURANCE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE CONSTRUED AGAINST 
ITS DRAFTER. 
In reaching its decision to affirm the trial court, the 
Court of Appeals improperly failed to consider and apply a 
fundamental rule of construction that ambiguities in an insurance 
contract should be strictly construed against its drafter. 
L.D.S. Hospital v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 858-59 
(Utah 1988); Metropolitan Property & Liability v. Finlayson, 751 
P.2d 254, 257 (Utah App. 1988). The Court of Appeals1 apparent 
failure to apply this critical rule of consttuction to Retro 
Agreement B, an insurance agreement, is a clear departure from 
fundamental principles of insurance law. 
Moreover, the unique retrospective premium agreements 
at issue in this case raise a question of law regarding contract 
construction not previously settled by this Court. In this 
regard, a decision by the Utah Supreme Court is necessary to 
provide guidance to both insurers and insureds in this unique 
area of the insurance industry. 
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II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 
EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE RECEIVED BY THE TRIAL COURT 
ESTABLISHED MOTOR CARGO'S KNOWLEDGE OF LOSING ITS 
PREMIUM REFUND IN THE EVENT OF EARLY CANCELLATION. 
In its Opinion, the Court of Appeals clearly 
acknowledged that paragraphs 13 and 16 of Retro Agreement B, both 
pertaining to Motor Cargo's right to an excess premium refund, 
are in direct conflict with each other. Appellate Court Opinion, 
p. 2. More specifically, the Court of Appeals recognized that 
"Paragraph 15 acknowledges the refund provision of Paragraph 13, 
while at the same time imposing a penalty that arguably 
disregards Paragraph 13.ff Id., p. 3. Acknowledging such 
ambiguity, the Court of Appeals noted that extrinsic evidence was 
required to properly interpret Retro Agreement B. A review of 
the extrinsic evidence received by the trial court demonstrates 
that this evidence cannot, under any interpretation, be construed 
to establish that Motor Cargo knew it would lose its right to an 
excess premium refund in the event of early cancellation. In 
that regard, the Court of Appeals committed reversible error. 
TIE argued on appeal that the trial court's Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law were based on the "unopposed and 
unrefuted" affidavits submitted by TIE and that consequently 
there was no basis in the record below to support a determination 
that the findings and judgment were clearly erroneous. Contrary 
to TIE'S assertion, its affidavits were directly contradicted by 
the admissible portions of the Affidavit of William K. Maxwell. 
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Specifically, Maxwell's affidavit directly refutes the 
interpretation of paragraphs 13 and 16, forwarded by TIE and 
purportedly supported by the affidavits of Paul J. Semons and 
Wendell Wells. 
Maxwell, who in the past had represented TIE, after 
carefully reading Retro Agreement B, expressed to Motor Cargo's 
officer, Harold Tate, that in his opinion Motor Cargo would not 
lose its right to an excess premium refund in the event of early 
cancellation. (R. 176.) Although Maxwell's opinion itself was 
stricken by the trial court, the fact that this opinion was 
communicated to Mr. Tate prior to Motor Cargo's decision to 
cancel was admissible to support Motor Cargo's reasonable 
interpretation of paragraphs 13 and 16 in the event of early 
cancellation. Moreover, Maxwell's affidavit further states that 
his opinion was also based upon the opinion of another insurance 
agent, James Keddington, employed by Diversified Insurance 
Brokers. (R. 176.) Once again, although the opinion itself of 
Keddington was stricken by the trial court as inadmissible 
evidence, the fact that Maxwell relied on thjLs opinion is 
admissible evidence, lending support to the Reasonable 
interpretation of paragraphs 13 and 16 forwarded by Motor Cargo. 
There were no Findings of Fact made by the trial court concerning 
these communications, which implies that the trial court failed 
to acknowledge this evidence. This failure constitutes 
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reversible error. The Court of Appeals did not acknowledge or 
refute this error. 
Moreover, upon careful review of TIE'S affidavits, it 
is clear that Motor Cargo was never told by TIE that, in the 
event of early cancellation under Retro Agreement B, Motor Cargo 
would lose its right to an excess premium refund provided by 
paragraph 13. Wendell Wells, one of TIEfs representatives, 
stated in his affidavit that he conducted preliminary discussions 
with representatives of Motor Cargo regarding the execution of 
Retro Agreement B. In these discussions, Wells stated that he 
explained the contents of Retro Agreement B to Motor Cargofs 
representatives and, in particular, "how the cancellation 
provisions of paragraph 15 would apply." Id. He then further 
explained that: 
[A]11 interim refunds and premium adjustments 
were subject to a final adjustment and 
settlement at the end of the agreed three-
year term . . . if the agreements were 
terminated by Motor Cargo before the end of 
the three-year term, that the provisions of 
Paragraph 16 of the Retro Agreement would 
apply and that the premium then due would be 
the greater of the retrospective or basic 
premium computed under the terms of the 
policy, plus a ten percent (10%) short-range 
cancellation charge, and that Motor Cargo 
would lose the benefits of retrospective 
rating. 
(R. 229-30.) (Emphasis added,.) Based upon this evidence, the 
trial court specifically made Finding of Fact No. 16: 
The cancellation provision was 
specifically explained to an officer of Motor 
1316/JHS -.
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Cargo when the Retro Agreement wa^ entered 
into, that is, that in the event of 
cancellation of the Policy before the three 
(3) year term ended, Motor Cargo would lose 
the benefit of retrospective rating. 
(R. 392.) (Emphasis added.) 
Nowhere in the affidavits of Semor^ s or Wells, or 
anywhere in the record, is there any evidence that TIE explained 
to Motor Cargo at the time it entered into I^ etro Agreement B 
that, in the event of early cancellation by Motor Cargo, it would 
lose its right to an excess premium refund expressly provided for 
under paragraph 13. Finding of Fact No. 16 clearly acknowledges 
this shortcoming. The trial court erroneously equated "losing 
the benefit of retrospective rating" with loping the right to an 
excess premium refund. This conclusion is totally unsupported by 
the record. The Court of Appeals appears to have made the same 
erroneous conclusion. 
The Court of Appeals' decision condones the trial 
court's clear departure from proper construction of extrinsic 
evidence to resolve ambiguities in a contract. Simply put, the 
extrinsic evidence admitted by the trial court in no way 
establishes, or even purports to establish, that Motor Cargo knew 
it would lose its right to an excess premium refund in the event 
of early cancellation. This clear departure is highly improper 
and must be corrected by this Court. 
1316/JHS 17 
CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons discussed herein, Motor Cargo 
respectfully requests that this Court grant its petition for a 
writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of 
Appeals. 
Dated this IQ* day of September, 1990. 
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT & BENDINGER 
Jay D. Gurmankin (1275) 
Mark Y. Hirata (5087) 
500 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 533-8383 
By 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On this 13th day of September, 1990, four copies of the 
foregoing Petition for Writ of Certiorari were sent by first-
class mail with postage thereon fully prepaid to: 
MAZURAN, VERHAAREN & HAYES 
Harold C. Verhaaren 
Mark F. Bell 
2180 South 1300 East. Suite 260 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
j^^as^.kjz^^ 
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HAROLD C. VERHAAREN - 3326 
MARK F. BELL - 4536 
MAZURAN, VERHAAREN & HAYES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Parkview Plaza, Suite 260 
2180 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Telephone: (801) 484-6161 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE, : 
a corporation, FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
: Civil NO. 34602 
MOTOR CARGO, a Utah 
corporation, : Judge Rodney S. Page 
Defendant. : 
oooOooo 
All issues in this proceeding not heretofore resolved by 
the Order and Judgment of the Court dated February 25, 1987, 
excepting those claims asserted in the defendant's Amended 
Counterclaim for trade liable and interference with contract and 
business advantage, were submitted to the Court for separate trial 
and judgment pursuant to Rules 39(b) and 52(a) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure based upon the parties' Motions, the stipulated 
facts contained in the parties' Stipulation dated December 16, 
1987, (the "Stipulation"), and upon the Affidavits and Memoranda 
submitted in support of their respective positions. The Court 
FILMED 
APPENDIX A 
thereafter entered its written Memorandum Decision dated May 20, 
1988, its written Supplemental Ruling dated July 27, 1988, and its 
oral ruling on January 3, 1989. Further, in accordance with the 
parties' Stipulation of Dismissal dated December 14, 1988, the 
Court entered its Order dated December 29, 1988, dismissing the 
defendant's Amended Counterclaim. The Court, now being fully 
advised in the premises, herewith enters its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The plaintiff, Truck Insurance Exchange ("TIE") at 
all times material to its Complaint in this matter was duly 
licensed to conduct the business of an insurer in the State of 
Utah. 
2. The defendant Motor Cargo, a Utah corporation 
("Motor Cargo") at all times material to TIE'S Complaint 
maintained its principal place of business in North Salt Lake, 
Davis County, State of Utah. 
3. Pursuant to the application of Motor Cargo and the 
terms of an agreement between the parties dated March 1, 1979, 
designated as "Retrospective Premium Determination 
Agreement—Plan III" ("Retro Agreement—A"), TIE issued its 
policy of insurance No. 6120-00-40 (the "Policy") to Motor Cargo 
having an effective date of Maxch 1, 1979. A copy of Retro 
Agreement—A is attached to the parties' Stipulation as 
Exhibit "0." 
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4. From March 1, 1979 to March 1, 1982, the term of the 
Retro Agreement—A and the Policy, TIE provided insurance coverage 
to Motor Cargo. 
5. At the request of Motor C&rgo, the Policy was 
renewed for an additional three-year period beginning on March 1, 
1982, and a second Retrospective Premium Determination 
Agreement—Plan III ("Retro Agreement—B") was executed by the 
parties. A copy of Retro Agreement—B is attached to the parries' 
Stipulation as Exhibit "P." 
6. The second agreement, Retro Agreement—B, signed 
March 2, 1982, was identical to Retro Agreement—A except for 
certain percentage changes in the definition portion of Retro 
Agreement—B. 
7. The Retro Agreements generally provide for a basic 
premium which Motor Cargo was required to peiy on a monthly basis, 
but which allow adjustments to that premium by way of additional 
payments by Motor Cargo or credits or refunds to Motor Cargo for 
any excess payments. 
8. The Retro Agreements and the Policy are somewhat 
unique to TIE and allowed Motor Cargo a much broader insurance 
coverage at substantial savings over a standard or fixed-rate 
policy conditioned upon Motor Cargo's loss history and the extent 
to which Motor Cargo is determined to be self insuring. 
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9. Retrospective rating under the Retro Agreements 
provides a method of determining, in retrospect, what the final 
earned premium for the Policy will be for the agreed term of the 
Policy. 
10. Under retrospective rating, the final earned premium 
is determined by considering a number of factors, including the 
amount of losses an insured sustains, administrative costs, 
expenses for adjusting claims, and applicable premium taxes in 
accordance with the agreed formula. 
11. Determining premiums retrospectively in the manner 
set forth in the Retro Agreements benefits an insured by allowing 
it the option of partial self-insurance, and because of the 
retrospective retention, of achieving broader insurance coverage 
at a substantially reduced cost compared to the premium for similar 
coverage under a standard policy. 
12. The benefits and potential savings to the insured 
are dependent upon the insured's loss experience over the agreed 
term, as retrospective rating is designed to recognize the merits 
of each individual risk based upon the loss experience of the 
insured. Each insured develops its own record with respect to the 
premium to be paid at the end of the agreed term. 
13. A substantial part of the consideration to TIE in 
entering into the Retro Agreements with Motor Cargo was the 
agreement of Motor Cargo to continue insurance coverage in force 
for the specified term of three (3) years rather than the one-year 
term of a standard policy. 
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14. Paragraph 16 of the Retro Agreements provides for 
cancellation by either party upon thirty (30) days written notice 
and that the premium upon cancellation prifcr to the end of the 
three-year term would be computed in accordance with other terms 
of the agreement, subject to certain additional provisions 
depending upon whether the insured, Motor Cargo, or the insurer, 
TIE, cancelled. 
15. Paragraph 16 also provides, among other things, that 
if the insured, Motor Cargo, cancelled the Policy, that the minimum 
earned premium would be 110% of the Retrospective Premium or of the 
Basic Premium, whichever was greater. 
16. The cancellation provision was specifically 
explained to an officer of Motor Cargo when the Retro Agreement was 
entered into, that is, that in the event of cancellation of the 
Policy before the three (3) year term ended, Motor Cargo would lose 
the benefits of retrospective rating. 
17. In a written notice dated February 28, 1983, Motor 
Cargo properly gave notice to TIE to cancel all insurance policies 
then in effect between Motor Cargo and TIE, including the Policy. 
18. In accordance with that notice, TIE cancelled the 
Policy as of February 28, 1983. 
19. In accordance with the provisions of the Retro 
Agreements, following the cancellation of the Policy, and after 
making various accounting adjustments, TIE sent Motor Cargo its 
final invoice showing a premium due of $68,394.00, which included 
a sum equal to 110% of the greater of the Basic Premium or the 
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Retrospective Premium due on Retro Agreement—B, but which gave 
Motor Cargo no credit for any excess premium which it claims was 
due it. 
20. Motor Cargo is indebted to TIE for insurance 
coverage provided under the Policy and the Retro Agreements in the 
principal sum of $68,394.00, plus accruing interest. 
21. Motor Cargo is entitled to the award of reasonable 
attorney's fees. 
22. While all time claimed by TIE'S attorney was 
actually spent in prosecuting TIE'S claims against Motor Cargo, the 
rate charged was reasonable, and the issues, though limited, were 
complex and difficult, some items could have been handled by an 
associate in TIE'S law firm or by a clerk at a lesser hourly rate, 
even though that decision was ultimately for TIE'S counsel to make 
and even though the Court, were he a practicing attorney, would 
personally feel more comfortable handling those items. 
Accordingly, the attorney's fee requested by TIE'S attorney should 
be reduced to $14,500, a reasonable fee under the circumstances. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court 
herewith enters its 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. In the first instance, the Court is required to look 
to the terms of the contract and their plain meaning on questions 
of interpretation. Only when the Court finds the contract to be 
ambiguous or inconsistent may it turn to the general rules of 
construction, i.e. favoring specific provisions over general, 
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first dated provisions over later, and construction against the 
scrivener. 
2. The Retro Agreements entered into by the parties on 
March 1, 1979 and on March 1, 1982, are identical with the 
exception of some percentage changes in the definition paragraph 
of the agreement entered into on March lf 1982. 
3. The definition portion of the I^ etro Agreements 
defines the terms "Basic Premium" and "Retrospective Premium." 
4. Paragraph 4(b) of Retro Agreement—B (the "Agreement") 
defines the basic premium as being 76.42% of the Standard Premium. 
Paragraph 4(a) defines the "Standard Preitiium" as the premium 
established in the Policy. 
5. Paragraph 4(f) of the Agreement Refines »Retrospective 
Premium" as: 
"The earned premium according to this agreement, 
computed as the sum of Incurred Losses, plus Service 
Fee, plus Premium Taxes, in no everit to exceed the 
Standard Premium." 
6. Paragraph 12 of the Agreement specifically provides 
how the Retrospective Premium is to be computed. 
7. Paragraph 13 of the Agreement provides for 
adjustments to the premium for any excess premium under certain 
circumstances. 
8. Paragraph 16 of the Agreement provides, among other 
things, that either party may cancel on thirty (30) days written 
notice and that the premium for cancellation prior to the end of 
the term shall be computed in accordance with the other provisions 
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of the Agreement, subject to the additional provisions in Paragraph 
16. 
9. One of the additional provisions of Paragraph 16 
provides, in part, that if the insured cancels, the minimum 
earned premium shall be 110% of the Retrospective or Basic 
Premium, whichever is greater. 
10. The Agreement specifically defines Basic Premium 
and Retrospective Premium and the manner of their calculation. Any 
adjustments thereto provided in the Agreement are not included in 
the definition of those terms nor in their calculation. 
11. Paragraph 16 specifically makes any manner of 
calculation in the Agreement subject to the provisions of 
subparagraph 16(a) which specifically establishes the minimum 
earned premium upon cancellation at 110% of the Retrospective 
Premium or Basic Premium, whichever is greater. This paragraph 
makes no mention of any adjustments to these calculations, nor 
that there is to be a penalty of 10% of any premium so adjusted. 
12. Based upon the foregoing, the Court concludes that 
the Agreement under its terms is clear and unambiguous and that the 
earned premium on cancellation by the insured, Motor Cargo, is 
equal to 110% of the Basic Premium or Retrospective Premium, 
whichever is greater, as calculated pursuant to Paragraphs 4, 
subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c); Paragraph 12, and Paragraph 16 of 
the Agreement. 
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13. The Basic Premium at the tim£ of the cancellation 
was $139,600.00 and the Retrospective Premium at that time was 
$82,669.00. 
14. Motor Cargo has paid no excefes premiums, and thus 
is entitled to no credit for excess premiums as it contends. 
15. TIE is entitled to judgment On its Second Cause of 
Action against Motor Cargo for the sum of $13,960.00, i.e. 10% of 
the Basic Premium of $139,600.00, less a credit of $16,530.00 due 
the defendant as shown on TIE'S final invoice with the difference 
between those sums, namely $2,570.00 to be allowed as a credit 
against the principal amount of $70,964.00 awarded against Motor 
Cargo in the Summary Judgment dated Februairy 25, 1987, on TIE'S 
First Cause of Action, leaving a total principal amount owed by 
Motor Cargo to TIE on both causes of action of $68,394.00. 
16. Because Motor Cargo's Amended Counterclaim has been 
dismissed and it is entitled to recover nothing thereby or by way 
of setoff or defenses in accordance with Paragraph 1 of the Summary 
Judgment dated February 25, 1987, TIE is entitled to accruing 
interest on the sum of $68,394.00 at the rate of 10% per annum from 
February 25, 1988, until judgment is entered based upon the 
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
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17. In addition, and as part of the judgment, Motor 
Cargo should be awarded reasonable attorney's fees amounting to 
$14,500.00 and its costs incurred herein amounting to $60.00. 
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. 
DATED this )& day of jpU . , 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I herewith certify that I am a member of and/or employed 
by the law firm of MAZURAN, VERHAAREN & HAYES, P.C., Parkview 
Plaza, Suite 260, 2180 South 1300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah and 
that in said capacity and pursuant to Rule 5 Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, a true copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law was caused to be served upon: 
Jay D. (Jurmankin 
Giaque & Williams 
500 Keairns Bui ld ing 
136 South Main Street 
Salt LaKe City, Utah 84101 
by hand-delivery this VS day of January, 1989. 
tie.m-fndcl 
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HAROLD C. VERHAAREN - 3326 
MARK F. BELL - 4536 
MAZURAN, VERHAAREN & HAYES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Parkview Plaza, Suite 260 
2180 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Telephone: (801) 484-6161 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MOTOR CARGO, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENTl 
Civil No. 34602 
Judge Rodney S. Page 
oooOooo 
All issues in this proceeding not heretofore resolved by 
the Order and Judgment of the Court dated February 25, 1987, 
excepting those claims asserted in the defendant's Amended 
Counterclaim for trade liable and interference with contract and 
business advantage, were submitted to the Cou^ rt for separate trial 
and judgment pursuant to Rules 39(b) and 52(a) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure based upon the parties' Motions, the stipulated 
facts contained in the parties' Stipulation dated December 16, 
1987, and upon the Affidavits and Memoranda submitted in support 
of their respective positions. The Court thereafter entered its 
JUDGMENT ENTERED FILMED 
A P P ^ N D T Y R 
written Memorandum Decision dated May 20, 1988, its written 
Supplemental Ruling dated July 27, 1988, and its oral ruling on 
January 3, 1989. Further, in accordance with the parties' 
Stipulation of Dismissal dated December 14, 1988, the Court entered 
its Order dated December 29, 1988, dismissing the defendant's 
Amended Counterclaim, The Court, having also made and entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, herewith 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that the plaintiff do have 
and recover judgment against the defendant on the First and Second 
Causes of Action of the plaintiff's Complaint in the principal sum 
of Sixty-eight Thousand Three Hundred Ninety-four Dollars 
($68,394.00), accruing interest on that sum at the rate of ten 
percent (10%) per annum or $18.74 per day from February 25, 1988, 
until the date hereof, a reasonable attorney's fee of Fourteen 
Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($14,500.00), and costs of $60.00, 
together with interest on the total judgment at the rate of 12% per 
annum from the date hereof until paid in full. 
This Judgment supersedes the Order and Judgment of the 
Court dated February 5, 1987. 
DATED this 13^ day of \*lo » 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Iy^ o <. .y_» » ^ -
District/Court Judge 
GURMANKIN 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I herewith certify that I am a member of and/or employed 
by the law firm of MAZURAN, VERHAAREN & HAYES, P.C., Parkview 
Plaza, Suite 260, 2180 South 1300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah and 
that in said capacity and pursuant to Rule 5 Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, a true copy of the foregoing Judgment was caused to be 
served upon: 
Jay D. Gurmankin 
Giaque & Williams 
500 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
by first-class mail on this 2- day of February, 1989. 
tie.m-order 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Truck Insurance Exchange, a 
corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Motor Cargo, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. ) 
OPINION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 890180-CA 
F I L E D 
JUL 30J990 
Second District, Davis County 
The Honorable Rodney S. Page u*nc*^ t«-
Attorneys: Jay D. Gurmankin, Mark Y. Hirata, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellant 
Harold C. Verhaaren, Mark F. Bell, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellee 
Before Judges Davidson, Billings, and Greenwood. 
DAVIDSON, Judge: 
Appellee Truck Insurance Exchange (TIE) filed a complaint 
against Appellant Motor Cargo for breach of an insurance policy 
and a retrospective premium determination agreement. The trial 
court found that Motor Cargo is indebted to TIE for insurance 
coverage in the principal sum of $68,394, plus accruing 
interest. We affirm. 
This controversy focuses on a three-year retrospective 
premium determination agreement entered into by the parties. 
Motor Cargo, which exercised its right to terminate the agreement 
after one year, claims that it is only subject under the 
agreement to a ten percent cancellation penalty. Under a 
different interpretation, TIE claims that Motor Cargo is liable 
for a ten percent penalty in the amount of $13,960 and that this 
penalty prevents Motor Cargo from recovering $56,931 in 
retrospective excess premiums, resulting in an actual total 
penalty of fifty-one percent. 
APPENDIX C 
Two of the agreement's pertinent provisions directly 
conflict with one another. Paragraph 13 provides for the refund 
of excess retrospective premiums, following the computation of 
the retrospective premiums at specified time intervals. 
Paragraph 16, on the other hand, provides that "[t]he premium for 
a cancellation prior to the end of the term of this agreement 
shall be computed in accordance with the other provisions of this 
agreement, subject to the following additional provisions." 
(Emphasis added.) The operative additional provision in 
Paragraph 16 reads "the minimum earned premium shall be 110% of 
the Retrospective or Basic Premium, whichever is the greater, but 
the amount so calculated shall not exceed the Standard Premium as 
defined in this agreement. . . ." The trial court determined 
that since the basic premium was higher than the retrospective 
premium. Motor Cargo was not entitled to the excess premiums. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that M[i]n contract 
actions, we defer to the trial judge on issues of fact, but not 
on issues of law." 50 W. Broadway Assoc, v. Redevelopment Agency 
of Salt Lake Citv, 784 P.2d 1162, 1171 (Utah 1989). The supreme 
court's standard of review of a trial court's interpretation of a 
contract is that: 
A contract's interpretation may be 
either a question of law, determined by 
the words of the agreement, or a question 
of fact, determined by extrinsic evidence 
of intent. If a trial court interprets a 
contract as a matter of law, we accord its 
construction no particular weight, 
reviewing its action under a correctness 
standard. However, if the contract is not 
an integration or is ambiguous and the 
trial court proceeds to find facts 
respecting the intentions of the parties 
based on extrinsic evidence, then our 
review is strictly limited. 
Id. (quoting Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985)). 
This court has stated that M[i]n the first instance, the 
determination of whether or not a contract is ambiguous is a 
question of law." Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert. 784 
P.2d 1210, 1213 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). "Where questions arise in 
the interpretation of an agreement, the first source of inquiry is 
within the document itself. It should be looked at in its 
entirety and in accordance with its purpose. All of its parts 
should be given effect insofar as that is possible." Big 
Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake Citv, 740 P.2d 1357, 1359 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987). 
We disagree with the trial court's legal conclusion that the 
contract in this case is unambiguous. Paragraph 16 acknowledges 
the refund provision of Paragraph 13, while at the same time 
imposing a penalty that arguably disregards Paragraph 13. A 
plain reading of the contract does not indicate whether "in 
accordance with" Paragraph 13 controls over the contract being 
"subject to" the additional provisions of Paragraph 16. Nor does 
a plain reading lead to the sure conclusion that Motor Cargo 
would give up the premium refund plus pay a penalty rather than 
being subject to the more customary trade penalty of ten percent. 
Extrinsic evidence may be admitted to construe an ambiguous 
contract. See 50 W. Broadway Assoc, 784 P.2d at 1171; Kimball, 
699 P.2d at 716. This contract's ambiguity requires extrinsic 
evidence in order for the contract to be properly interpreted. 
The court received such extrinsic evidence and refers to it in 
the findings. Such evidence showed that the parties discussed 
the provisions at issue prior to entering into the agreement and 
that they knew the excess premium refund would be lost in the 
event of cancellation by Motor Cargo. We therefore hold that the 
trial court correctly admitted extrinsic evidence in this case 
and, under the standard set forth in Kimball,1 we leave the 
court's findings of fact undisturbed. 
**TS*5H^*» 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
JuditJjJM. Billings, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
1. M[I]f the contract is not an integration or is ambiguous and 
the trial court proceeds to find facts respecting the intentions 
of the parties based on extrinsic evidence, then our review is 
strictly limited.- Kimball, 699 P.2d at 716. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
F I L E D 
Lite.") Ccun * ACLASIS 
Truck Insurance Exchange/ a 
corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Motor Cargo, a Utah corporation, 
Defendants and Appellant. 
ORDER DENYING PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 890180-CA 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon 
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing, filed August 10, 
1990, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Appellant's Petition for 
Rehearing is denied. 
Dated this / * * • day of August, 1990. 
FOR THE COURT 
Mary*T/ Noonan, Clerk 
c O E i V E D 
Auu 181990 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 17th day of August, 1990, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 
REHEARING was deposited in the United States mail or personally 
delivered to each of the parties below. 
Jay D. Gurmankin 
Mark Y. Hirata 
Attorneys at Law 
Giauque, Williams, Wilcox & Bendinger 
136 South Main 
500 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Harold C. Verhaaren 
Mark F. Bell 
Mazuran, Verhaaren & Hayes, P,C, 
Attorneys at Law 
Parkview Plaza, Suite 260 
2180 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
DATED this 17th day of August, 1990. 
